The Smug Baldy Speaks

Millions of Americans are waking today to the reality of President Bush’s LBJ-esque plan to escalate troop levels in Iraq. The rationale for this strategy, which runs counter to the advice of many military planners and the wishes of most Americans, is that this uptick in American military personnel will provide the security needed to help the Iraqi government “regain the capital” (the White House’s words) and to protect the Iraqi population from sectarian violence.

Much of the criticism of this uptick (about a 20% increase in American troops, most of whom will be deployed to Baghdad) rests on the thinking that the time for a military solution in Iraq has passed, and that any plan that will solve the civil war in Iraq must be a political one.

I wonder if there isn’t something else going on. I think it’s very likely that the thinking in this White House is driven by something known as an Illusion of Control, and that it’s strategy has fallen prey to a classic management trap: The Sunk Cost Dilemma.

Illusion of Control is probably best described here:

The theory of the illusion of control (IOC) was first defined by Ellen Langer (1975) as an expectancy of a personal success probability that exceeds the objective probability of the outcome. This type of overconfidence is likely when an event that is at least partially determined by chance is characterized by factors that normally lead to enhanced outcomes under skill-based situations, such as choice, stimulus or response familiarity, competition, and passive or active involvement (Langer, 1975). These skill-related cues thus give rise to individuals’ perceived control over an outcome, which in turn leads to an unrealistic subjective probability of success.

It doesn’t take much of an intellectual stretch to see how this might have applied to the war planning of this White House: Planners had great expectations of a quick military victory - and this led to an unrealistic perception of control in an environment that became increasingly violent and chaotic over time. Such misperceptions of control could clearly support the now discredited notion that, by simply staying the course, we would have greater success - and ultimate victiry in Iraq.

One thing that this White House needs to be honest about is exactly what we do and do not have control over in Iraq. We do have control over our troops, and largely over where they’re sytationed and what they do. We do not have control over the Iraqi government, its forces, and its policies. We do not have control over the insurgency, or the various factions and their death squads. In addition - we do not have control over the perception of American military policy and motivations at home, in Iraq, or anywhere else.

Another thing this White House appears to be doing is falling into a Sunk Cost Dilemma with regard to the Iraq War. Indeed, it’s not uncommon to hear proponents of the war within the administration cite the costs already spent in terms of American lives and dollars as a justification for continued investment - and now - escalation. The sunk cost dilemma - also known as simply throwing good money after bad - is a known project management issue. It often occurs in large organizations that have already made substantial investments in a particular project, and will continue to invest in the same project - even though these investments may not be paying out. Apparently, in some large organizations, some projects seem to take on a life of their own, and there is no easy way out of the trap.

One site outlines these factors to consider when faced with such a situation, and it’s interesting that these were not generated in response to the Iraq War:

• Be careful and realistic when assessing projects and organisational capacities to run large projects. Try to avoid over-optimism. Set up a list of “project risks” and decide, if you are prepared to accept these risks. Use your entire tool set to analyse those heavy investments and set up a worst case scenario. Define a PSR (point of safe return). Look also only at incremental costs and revenues.
• Prepare the organisation to stop and to kill strategic projects early when they are not able to meet milestones.
• Employ a gated funding strategy: Set up certain small milestones, which have to be met. If the project overrun these milestones, stop it.